Jack Hayes recently argued in Forbes that Britain does not need more startups, it needs more family businesses. The headline is deliberately provocative, but the more interesting idea sits underneath it.
The real divide is not between startups and family firms. Most family businesses were startups once. The more useful distinction is between a company that is being built to become commercially self-sustaining and one whose story depends on what it might become later.
Britain is not short of new ventures. British Business Bank figures show 314,000 new VAT and PAYE business start-ups in 2025. Nor is the country short of attention for the small number of companies pursuing exceptional growth. Funding rounds, valuations, accelerators, exits and unicorns are highly visible because exceptional outcomes make good stories.
But exceptional outcomes are, by definition, exceptional. At the start of 2025 there were around 5.7 million private-sector businesses in the UK. Small and medium-sized enterprises accounted for almost all of them, 60 per cent of private-sector employment and just over half of private-sector turnover. Most will never become unicorns. Most will never need to.
That does not make them unsuccessful startups. It makes the possibility of becoming a real business more important than the possibility of becoming a famous one.
For many founders, the economically meaningful journey is much quieter. They identify something customers need. They learn what those customers will actually pay. They discover what it really costs to deliver. They improve the offer. Revenue begins to repeat. The founder earns a living. Then perhaps one person is employed, followed by another. Suppliers get paid. Tax gets paid. Skills accumulate. Customers come back. The business slowly becomes less dependent on hope and more dependent on things it has actually demonstrated.
Nothing about that process makes an exciting fundraising announcement. It can, however, create a good life.
That matters because the founder does not live inside a venture-capital portfolio. A business that provides a reliable income can pay a mortgage, support children, create pension contributions and reduce the financial uncertainty carried by a household. If it employs other people, the effect spreads into their households too.
The national effect is equally easy to overlook. A commercially durable company does not need to dominate a market to contribute to the economy. It needs to continue doing something useful at a price customers will pay while retaining enough money to keep doing it.
That is why the description "family business" is interesting. The Family Business Research Foundation reports that 73 per cent of UK SME employers were family-owned in 2024. Family ownership itself does not make a company good. Family firms can be badly managed, resist change and fail like any other business. What the category often represents, however, is duration. The company has survived long enough for ownership, employment, reputation and accumulated knowledge to matter across years rather than funding rounds.
The startup conversation can easily reverse that order. A founder can be encouraged to think about scale before repeatability, investment before economics and visibility before commercial proof. The ambition becomes to look like the kind of company that might one day become enormous.
There is nothing wrong with building an enormous company. Some businesses genuinely require substantial external capital. Some opportunities only make sense at scale. Some founders will create businesses capable of generating extraordinary returns.
The mistake is turning that exceptional route into the default definition of serious entrepreneurship. A specialist engineering company employing twelve people is not a failed technology startup. A profitable care business operating in three towns is not an underachieving unicorn. A professional-services company producing a strong return for its owners and giving twenty people stable employment is not economically unimportant because no venture capitalist wants to buy part of it.
Scale of ambition should not be confused with quality of business. The same distinction matters at the earliest stage. A founder can build a brand, website, product, pitch deck and social presence remarkably quickly. Modern tools make the appearance of a company easier to create than at any previous point. But a company does not become economically real because it looks ready.
Customers still have to choose it. Revenue still has to arrive. Delivery still has to work. Costs still have to be survived. Enough of that behaviour has to repeat for the founder to understand what they actually have.
Britain should continue to produce ambitious technology companies. It should continue to welcome businesses capable of competing globally and attracting investment. But that cannot be the only success story worth telling.
The startup economy spends enormous energy celebrating the moment somebody begins. The harder and ultimately more valuable transition comes afterwards, when an idea becomes something capable of supporting itself and the people who depend upon it.
Britain does not need every startup to become the next unicorn. It needs many more of them to become businesses.
The more useful question for a founder may therefore be much less glamorous than "How big could this become?" It may simply be: what evidence would tell me that this has actually become a business?
Sources
Department for Business and Trade, Business population estimates for the UK and regions 2025
British Business Bank, Small Business Finance Markets Report 2026
